The end of Russia?
By Yury Afanasiev On its present course, Russia is doomed, claims the distinguished historian, Yury Afanasiev. Why did reform change nothing? Why has the wheel of history turned back to autocracy? 500 years of oppression are reaching a terrible climax. In this important, excoriating essay, he challenges his people to face the truth about their history
Part One Are we not slaves?
I Russia's rulers behave like a government of occupation. So why do the people support them uncritically?
II Understanding the terrible enthusiasm of the masses
III The intelligentsia: as unfree today as in the past.
IV Imperial expansion versus freedom: an elite long ago co-opted
V Today's intelligentsia: the chorus of support
VI The wheel of history comes full circle: returning to "the Russian path"
Part Two 1917
I ‘Building socialism': Russia leaves the beaten track, sets about building the Kingdom of Heaven on earth
II Recipe for building socialism: eliminate the human element
III Social organization is replaced by crime and corruption
IV Moscow the Third Rome: a nation in the grip of mythological thinking
V A history of foreign policy annexations leads to Stalin's final solution: dependent individuals in place of society
Part Three The Character of Russian Power
I The Magna Carta v Genghis Khan's Great Yasa
II Russia looks to the past, Europe to the future
III After five centuries of civil war, only power is left standing
Part Four Late 1980's- early 1990's: Russia blows its latest historic chance
I Laying the foundations for catastrophe
II Yeltsin and Putin's key blunders
III The post-Soviet mutant: corporation-state + patrimonial state
IV The Yeltsin years: liberal ends, Bolshevist means
V The Putin years- onward to the past
VI "Rising from our knees", reaching a climax, facing the end of Russia
Part One Are we not slaves?
I Russia's rulers behave like a government of occupation. So why do the people support them uncritically?
In recent months we have witnessed a series of actions from the Russian government that seem at first glance paradoxical. I will list some of the most important:
- for the first time since the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan, Russian armed forces began and ended a "real" (not "cold") war" outside Russia (in Georgia);
- for the first time since the collapse of the USSR, strategic bombers and ships of the Russian armed forces and navy have been sent to Latin America.
- the return to "cold war" rhetoric has reached the point where the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs used obscene expressions when talking with a foreign (British) colleague
- Russian ships stationed in Sevastopol fought in the Black Sea against Georgia, in defiance of the Ukrainian president's ban on deploying them without informing Ukraine;
- Prime Minister Putin played the atomic blackmail card against the Czech Republic and Poland, using that "special" KGB way of his, loaded and enigmatic.
- with the blatant and increasing polarisation in the material wealth of the Russian population, the military budget has been increased by almost 30%;
- the President of Russia welcomed the election of the new US President with a promise that he would station rockets in the Kaliningrad Oblast which would threaten America's European allies.
These things seem paradoxical. After all, we're living in a nuclear age.
None of these events fit into the contemporary picture. Yet they can all be explained unparadoxically. However, in my opinion, this explanation will be even gloomier and more alarming than the "apparent paradoxes", the reality which is, as it were, shrouded in mist.
Take a look at what is happening before our very eyes. Take a good, hard look at it - realistically, rationally, in its historical context. If you do that, you start thinking you've gone mad, or at least that you're well on the way to it.
If these thoughts seem altogether too terrifying or strange, if you're so confident of your mental state that you can dismiss them, then what you what you are feeling will be no less terrible. For you will be feeling the void enveloping you.
A government of occupation
It is not an absolute void, of course. Here and there, however rarely, you can still find people who see things more or less as you do. For me, they are like shining lights. I try to take a steer from them in the darkness.
But even then the feeling of emptiness remains. For it has more than one cause. The problem is not just the government. If this were the case, then the darkness could at least partly be dispelled by understanding - even the grimmest actions of the authorities can at least be understood. However, even once you've done that you can't dispel that feeling of emptiness, because you don't know what to do with your understanding.
If you think things through properly, if you interpret them rigorously, the government's behaviour can only really be explained as alienated from its people. It is a government of occupation, a "Golden Horde" that is illegitimate and criminal as well.
Even when you are quite sure, even when your ideas are well-founded and supported by the facts, where do you turn to with this understanding? Obvious, you would think: you turn not to the government, but to the people.
II Understanding the terrible enthusiasm of the masses
But turning to the people only makes the emptiness worse. For the emptiness is coming from there too, from those "masses" at whom the grim actions of the authorities are directed. Those "masses" are not just putting up with the actions of the authorities in silence. They have started supporting them enthusiastically, as they did in the 1930s.
What makes matters worse is that it has happened before, this enthusiastic response of the masses to being manipulated and ridden roughshod over: it happened before the First World War and immediately after it. Then, the people and the Bolsheviks were so close that it is still not clear who gave whom more support and who was directing whom. But we do more or less know what the result of this coming together was. We know that it was lasting and fatal for both sides - vis the year 1991.
At the same time, we also know that the Russian people has never regarded the state as "a friend", and the normal response to state coercion has always been cunning, wiles, and finding ways around the law. While appearing to toe the line and be submissive, the people have always kept a clenched fist in their pockets. These outward signs of submissiveness and obedience were regarded (and still are) as a predisposition for patient endurance, and this habit can, if we wish, be interpreted as the people's support for the government.
At the moment Putin and his president appear to enjoy universal support. As the slogan, doggedly and regrettably repeated in Russia goes: "The people and the government are one". What this means is that neither the government nor the people have a modern, rational understanding of what either one or the other. It is not just the government that is questionable in this respect, but the people too. They have not yet started playing an active role in their own history. They remain a mass, a crowd. It's only in the last 18-20 years that the amorphous, atomized Russian-Soviet mass has started to become structured. But alas, the result is not the development of a civil society, but of something more like criminal clans.
Some may find this concept upsetting. They'll be inclined to conclude that "with your ideas about the people, you're never going to get through to them". I understand this. That's why I say that we're facing the void here too.
Periodic uprisings
Over many centuries, our people have endured sufferings which, as Karamzin put it, "you have to be villainous to endure". Hence the cunning, wiles and dual morality. But at the end of the 18th century, Karamzin was not to know that for the Russian people the greatest sufferings and the most morally corrupting consequences were yet to come.
From time to time we rose up against intolerable sufferings and the government. Once a century, with Razin, Pugachev or Lenin we celebrated our "wild freedom". Then we put our clenched fist back in our pockets and returned to our customary brutish existence.
Some people regarded these uprisings, joyfully or cynically, as an awakening. But in their sufferings, reckless protests, and savage anger, our people remained and remain a mass. A crowd that is worthy of sympathy and quiet sorrow, a crowd that is sometimes terrifying and loathsome. This is why the only people who have been able to get through to them in their usual state of unconsciousness, their permanent readiness for rebellion have been Lenin and Stalin, then Yeltsin and Putin. Who knows,perhaps in the near future someone like Zhirinovsky and Limonov may be able to do so too?
III The intelligentsia, as unfree today as in the past
The feeling of emptiness only gets worse when you try and get to grips with the views held by our creative and other intelligentsia, when you try and make out its voice and civic position.
This permits of many variations, and here and there, rarely, a few shining lights. For me, for example, one of them today is the film director Alexei German. But they are like lights in the darkness, in the biblical sense: the light either breaks through the darkness, or the darkness swallows it. This is what has happened in our history, alas, and in our time. The emptiness became even worse after the murders of Dmitry Kholodov, LarisaYudina, Galina Starovoitova, Sergei Yushenkov, Anna Politkovskaya and Magomed Evloev, after Andrei Piontkovsky was charged with "extremism" and Mikhail Beketov was brutally beaten up.
The emptiness gets even worse if you try and listen to our contemporary intellectuals not so much as individuals, but collectively, as the distinct voice of a particular "ethnos", or ethnic group. In short, our intellectuals today (except for a handful of outstanding people) are on the side of the government, not of the wider population. In my view this is the main reason why the population are still merely "the population", and have not become a "people".
If anything, the feeling of emptiness emanating from our intelligentsia gets worse when you consider the tradition of the last hundred years or more. This is something which it is not done to discuss out loud or to write about it as something that really exists and is understood down to the last detail. Thus the very problem of "the tradition of the Russian intelligentsia", vanishes into the void, enveloped in darkness.
This is not accident. This too can be explained.
IV Imperial expansion versus freedom: co-opting the elite
I'm talking about the traditional attitude to power of the Russian intelligentsia before 1917. This attitude stems from the fact that in one Russia two cultures have co-existed and confronted one another.
These two cultures were so different socially as well as spiritually that in the 18th century they even spoke different languages. So complete was the mutual incomprehension between them that throughout their history Russian intellectuals (and even the finest of our ‘liberal' Russian intelligentsia), were doing more than merely helping to build Russian power. Generally, they were on the side of the government, rather than the people.
What's more, the government they were helping to build was essentially autocratic, if not despotic. This explains why the Enlightenment has left so slight a trace on our national traditions of power.
If you look at the larger picture of Russian history, then the reasons why the Russian intelligentsia is as it is becomes far clearer. Ever since the 15th century, when Moscow started to build its Orthodox empire, the priority has been territorial expansion, without regard for the effect of this on the country's internal development. As the empire was expanding in very straitened economic conditions, the effect was of a progressive movement from freedom towards slavery: the last juice had to be squeezed out of the population by force.
This is every bit as true today. This absence of change has become an oppressive national problem, becoming a defining feature of Russianness in all its aspects, including the ascendancy of the state and the oppression of the individual.
This tradition of the intelligentsia backing the government is realized in the traditional split in the Russian spirit between freedom and empire, between the Russian will and Russian power.
Our renowned historian, philosopher and journalist Georgy Fedotov put it even more distinctly. According to him, after Pushkin "the gulf between empire and freedom in the Russian conscience became irrevocable. <...> Those who built or supported the empire drove out freedom, while those who fought for freedom destroyed the empire. The monarchic state could not withstand this suicidal disunity of spirit and force. The collapse of imperial Russia was primarily the consequence of this inner cancer that ate it up from the inside".
With the help of Georgy Fedotov, (who lived through the revolution and the world wars of the 20th century), I would like to return to the contemporary problem of "empire - freedom - personality". How is it being resolved today intellectually and in practice? Let us look at those people who, by virtue of their professions, embody the thinking and the spirit of Russia, and to determine its future now, in the 21st century.
I repeat: merely to consider this question will cast you willy-nilly into the void. For you find very few people in sympathy with your ideas. The government has already destroyed many of those who are.
The dominant voice, the social stance of enlightened, intellectual Russia, our "thinking class", is fully attuned to the position of our present government. Writers, scientists, theatre people and film directors, printed and electronic media journalists, university professors and the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church do not merely put up with the government silently and passively. They justify and support it. They resort to theoretical investigations, historical traditions, and their own understanding of moral values to try and rationalize its actions.
V Today's intelligentsia: the chorus of support
We could cite long lists of books and newspaper articles by way of confirmation. We could point to virtually the whole television broadcasting network, and to the school and university textbooks recently approved by the government. I will take just one (special) issue: "Five centuries of empire" in the magazine Expert on 31 December 2007. This magazine has recently become a kind of barometer for way that the governing class is thinking, and the intellectual elite that serves it.
The editorial article "The complex fate of empire" casts serious doubt on Russia's democratic prospects: "This form of rule is generally very vulnerable and unstable, and if there is no consensus in society that the country needs democracy, then it is impossible in principle. It is unrealistic to support a democratic regime if large and influential groups in society have the goal of destroying it".
This would all be very well - one can of course doubt whether democracy is suitable for Russia... If it weren't for the fact that what is offered as an alternative is not only doubtful, but also at the very least alarming.
From an article in the same issue, "Russia to the pessimists": "Territorial expansion has dominated Russia's view of world development. But there is no need to feel apologetic about this. We should be no less proud of the great nation that was built by our ancestors than the Swiss are of their watches, the French of their cuisine or the Italians of Renaissance art. And just as these achievements of other nations are not just a cause for pride, but a source of income, Russia's expanses, with their countless wealth and strategic positions, are paying themselves off for us today a hundredfold.
"The same can be said about our ability to live in harmony with our neighbours, and if necessary to fight them.
"This goes too for our ability to impose our own political culture, and the art of studying a foreign culture and accepting it as one's own.
"Russia has accepted everyone who wanted to become a part of it, everyone who was prepared to serve it.
"This is what freedom means for Russia's subjects. If for a Polish gentleman it lay in the right not to obey, if for an English lord it lay in the right to control the way his taxes were used, for a Russian nobleman freedom was expressed through his ability to take part in the great task of building the empire. Judge for yourself who had more freedom - the Pole whose disobedience, whose arrogance did not really matter to anyone or the Russian, whose readiness to serve made him the co-creator of world history?"
These are the guideline values, this is the world view of today's Russian intellectuals as expressed ideologically in the magazine Expert. The same motive runs through all the domestic and international policies of the Russian government. For all of them, the condition of freedom "in the grand historical scheme of things" is the GULAG, and Russia's great contribution to world civilization, compared with all other countries, is its imperial essence, the result of five centuries of expansion.
How the Russian nobleman became enslaved
Of course we should not be apologizing for the territorial expansion of the past. Our history is in itself neither a source of pride nor shame. We need to consider it, and to understand it. Each individual, and society as a whole, finds themselves and their identity in our ongoing efforts to find meaning in the events of the past,
If we're strictly faithful to the facts, we're forced to the conclusion that in his readiness to serve the empire and help build it, the Russian nobleman was expressing not his freedom, but his servility.
At the end of the 15th century, when Ivan III needed a large standing army to protect the large state and conquer new territories, but had no money to support it, they came up with a solution. The cavalry was formed, on the basis of conditional land ownership. These soldiers of the cavalry became the first group of noblemen to be enslaved. They were given land, but deprived of the right to choose. They could not change the landowner whom they had to serve. They could not do anything at their own discretion. They could only serve their owner. Some time later, they were given peasants too, and they enslaved these peasants, just as they themselves had been enslaved.
The Russian nobleman thus became doubly constrained: from the top by the obligation to serve the state, and from the bottom by the need to serve at the expense of the serfs, at the expense of "baptized property", as they were called at the time. This is not a matter that calls for judgment, or justification.
Today's "patriotically engaged" intellectuals have "no choice"
But the claim that "for the Russian nobleman, freedom was expressed in the readiness to serve, in the ability to take part in the great building of the empire" can be seen as the kind of key that unlocks the particular attitude to the past, and to Russian historical traditions, of those intellectuals grouped around the magazine "Expert". They think of themselves as "nationally concerned" and "patriotically engaged", but they also claim to be innovative and strictly scientific. "In order to develop a common view on history," reads their editorial, "we need a new, non-ideological approach. Of course, we cannot completely do away with the influence of ideology in studying the history of the country - the creation of a "canonic version", even with all possible variations, is impossible without a certain ideological position. But biased politicization is completely unacceptable."
If you think through to their logical conclusion some of the events which I described as paradoxes at the beginning of this article, they reveal a reality that is not just frightening, but terrifying. Before, you felt as if you were sinking into a void, as if no one understood, or seemed capable of reacting adequately. Now instead you see a vision. The outline of Putin's achievement rears up in front of you, the edifice he has created with his domestic and international politics. All you can say about this structure is that you don't want to believe your eyes.
The Nazism of Hitler and Stalin, we should note, were also not seen immediately, and their danger was felt when it was already too late - and furthermore, they have still not been felt by everyone, and not to the end.
The particular issue of Expert magazine quoted here is just one of many indicators. It gives you an idea of the extent of Putin's strategy of returning to the policies of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Another indicator, an embodiment of the "canonical version" of Russia history, was the mass publication of that school textbook.
The authors of "Expert", who claim to be taking a strict scientific approach that does not allow biased politicization, write: "the history of the Russian Empire is not so different from the history of other European empires. In many ways it was even more humane. But in any case, Russia had no choice whether to be an empire or a ‘normal European democratic nation'. There was a choice whether to be an empire or a colony."
The statement that "it was even more humane" should be left on the authors' conscience, especially if one remembers that the history of the Russian empire does not end in 1917.
The statement that "there was no choice" should also be left on the authors' conscience. Our entire life - for every person, for every country - is a constant, never-ending choice. Understanding the meaning of history involves finding an answer as to why this particular choice was made, and not another that was equally possible.
But let us imagine that even after analyzing all the arguments "for" and "against" a choice, using all the rules of a "strict scientific approach" and without "biased politicization", we come to the conclusion that yes, there "was no choice". Does this mean that we need to continue the path which we took to reach the present? Not forgetting that the intermediary points on this path were 1917, 1991 and 2008.
To judge by everything that is happening in the country, by the direction state thinking is taking, the consensus seems to be that we must continue on this path.
Russia's choice today
Russia is once more facing a choice: the Horde-Byzantine political policy of rule, the traditional Russian geopolitics, the Soviet messiahship, the all-consuming corruption and Putin's purge of the Russian political space - all of which can be seen quite clearly in the reality that surrounds us. Or...
I'm not sure that we have the time to think about any alternatives. Let alone putting them into practice.
Russia's war against Georgia marks the moment when two lines in our history crossed. In the short-term perspective, over the last 8-10 years, we have seen: the liquidation of elections, the court system and of independent media and political parties. We have seen the castration of legislative power. We have seen the law-enforcement bodies becoming repressive and criminal. We have seen rampant corruption, led from the top. We have seen sensational unsolved murders, and the deterioration of relations with neighboring (and not only neighboring) countries.
Then there is the very long term perspective. The war against Georgia is another episode in the wars of annexation that have continued for centuries. These have been aggravated by similar wars of non-liberation within the country.
VI The wheel of history turns full circle: returning to "the Russian path"
At the point where these two lines cross modern Russia returns full circle, to the Russian and Soviet path. We should talk briefly about what exactly we mean by these concepts... What creates this path, this repetition, this constantly changing permanency? I will only point out what are perhaps the most important components of this concept: Russia's geographical position and the size of its territory; the characteristics of its land and soil; the density, composition and dynamics of the population, and finally the nature of Russian power.
These are merely the objective, material, "substantial" and institutional elements which make up this "path", however. Lacking in spiritual content, they are dead in themselves, and cannot give rise to any repetition or rotation. Just as important, if not more so for this "path" are its spiritual elements: the Russian Orthodox church, the Messiah-complex and expansionism, the habits of a people and their ideology. All these elements taken together intertwine, interact, and change (sometimes beyond recognition) to create this "Russian path" to which we seem to have returned today.
"The Russian path"
When we talk of a "return", we mean that several times before - or at least once - we left the place that we are returning to. This applies to an ordinary return. But here we are not talking about an "ordinary" return, but a return "Russian style". In this country, it seems, we can only "sort of" return. In fact, "returning" in the Russian sense means to find ourselves once more in a place which, if we look carefully, we find we never even left.
As in any other history, there have been countless regressions in our history: from reforms to counter-reforms, from times of change to "stagnation", from "frosts" to "thaws".
But we have kept following the same path, the same direction. In fact, it's the path we have been on for 500 years. Chaadaev and Berdyaev called it not so much a progression as a blundering round the circle of history. Several times Russia, in the course of its historical movement, found itself at a crossroads. At these moments it looked as if we could have left the well-trodden path and taken the other.
In fact, the history of Russia as a united state began at one of these crossroads. The historian Alexander Zimin has given us the wonderful image of a "Knight at the crossroads", who could have come from a divided Rus' to a freer Russia. But the "knight" did not have the strength to break free from the constraints (the coercion of authority and submission of the people), which already had society in its thrall. He kept on the same road - the road of Russian autocracy, then of serfdom. "The Russian path" was the result of the coming together of these two basic components. It was the path of non-freedom.
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