Torturegate Canada: Anatomy Of Incompetence In Action - Part II

In Part I of this three-part in depth analysis, the series of events which lead to the December 2005 bilateral Canada-Afghanistan detainee transfer agreement were outlined, as well why and how this agreement was fundamentally flawed - thanks to an initial incompetent exercise on the part of the LPC Martin minority government. However, from early 2006, the CPC Harper minority government came to power - but rather than accepting the agreement's flaws that were being pointed out throughout the year in order to remedy said flaws, this government instead acted incompetently in turn by simply posturing in defense of the agreement and politically attacking its critics, all the while relying on their utter ignorance (or lack of understanding) of the actual contents of the agreement, of what the ICRC can and can't do, and of Article 12 of Geneva III.

As previously stated: the table was fully set for our country to receive the first confirmed news of Afghan detainee abuses following their transfer to the Afghan government.

While the detainee transfer agreement was being rightfully and correctly criticized by opposition MPs, a then-newly arrived senior Canadian diplomat in Afghanistan, one Richard Colvin, began in May 2006 to send a series of urgent warnings about the treatment of transferred detainees at the hands of Afghan authorities (namely the NSD). Additionally, at the end of 2006, the Canadian Afghanistan diplomatic team's annual human rights report further informed the Harper government about systemic problems of torture in Afghan jails.

In between, in March 2006, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour reported on the NSD thusly (emphasis added):

The NSD, responsible for both civil and military intelligence, operates in relative secrecy without adequate judicial oversight and there have been reports of prolonged detention without trial, extortion, torture, and systematic due process violations. Multiple security institutions managed by the NSD, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense, function in an uncoordinated manner, and lack central control. Complaints of serious human rights violations committed by representatives of these institutions, including arbitrary arrest, illegal detention and torture, are common.

Then in June 2006, it was reported that the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) had estimated that about one in three prisoners handed over by Canadians soldiers were beaten or tortured.

All these warnings were ignored by senior Canadian Forces and government officials - even though reports were widely circulated in the Foreign Affairs and Defense departments. Incidentally, the Canadian Forces erected a wall of secrecy around the practice of handing over detainees that was out of sync with Canada's NATO partners, refusing to share with both the Canadian public as well as NATO itself how many detainees the military had captured and transferred. Furthermore, there was also a wide-ranging deference to then-Chief of Defense Gen. Rick Hillier, who brushed off detainee torture allegations. The Red Cross was even compelled, despite their long-standing practice, to warn the Canadian army in Kandahar about what was happening to prisoners, doing so over three months in 2006 - but no one would even take their phone calls.

Thus Canada already there and then found itself in direct contravention to its legally-binding obligations under Article 12 of Geneva III (emphasis added):

Art 12. Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.

Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on the Power accepting them while they are in its custody.

Nevertheless, if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in any important respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being notified by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.

Indeed, by ignoring all those warnings of detainee abuses, and consequently failing to investigate immediately any and all allegations to this effect, Canada, as the primary detaining power of Afghan prisoners, found itself in gross, negligent dereliction of its legal responsibilities over the transferred detainees.

Furthermore, Canada likewise found itself in direct contravention of Article 21 of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (emphasis added):

1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article 3 that it recognizes the competence of the Committee (Against Torture) to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under this Convention. Such communications may be received and considered according to the procedures laid down in this article only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be dealt with by the Committee under this article if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. Communications received under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the following procedure:
   1. If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention, it may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within three months after the receipt of the communication the receiving State shall afford the State which sent the communication an explanation or any other statement in writing clarifying the matter which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent, references to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending, or available in the matter.
   2. If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States Parties concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to refer the matter to the Committee by notice given to the Committee and to the other State.
   3. The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it under this article only after it has ascertained that all domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is the victim of the violation of this Convention.
   4. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this article.
   5. Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c), the Committee shall make available its good offices to the States Parties concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the obligations provided for in the present Convention. For this purpose, the Committee may, when appropriate, set up an ad hoc conciliation commission.
   6. In any matter referred to it under this article, the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), to supply any relevant information.
   7. The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), shall have the right to be represented when the matter is being considered by the Committee and to make submissions orally and/or in writing.
   8. The Committee shall, within 12 months after the date of receipt of notice under subparagraph (b), submit a report.
      1. If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached.
      2. If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is not reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts; the written submissions and record of the oral submissions made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report.
   In every matter, the report shall be communicated to the States Parties concerned.

2. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five States Parties to this Convention have made declarations under paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under this article; no further communication by any State Party shall be received under this article after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the Secretary-General, unless the State Party concerned has made a new declaration.

Both Canada and Afghanistan are not only "State Parties" of this convention, but furthermore ratified it. Hence, by failing to take seriously the abuse of detainees and, consequently, by likewise failing to communicate with the Karzai government to this effect, Canada found itself negligent of its legally-binding obligations regarding this convention as well.

After all, ignorance of the law does is no defense for breaking the law. And both Geneva III and the Convention Against Torture constitute the laws of our land.

Which brings us forward to February 2007, essentially a year after the Harper minority government came to power. Our country was then shocked when University of Ottawa Law Professor Amir Attaran produced documents (that he obtained under the Access to Information Act) which revealed that three Afghan prisoners in the custody of Canadian military police were brought in by their Afghan interrogator for treatment of similar injuries to the head and upper body, all on the same day.

Thus allegations of torture of transferred detainees came out publicly for the first time.

To the credit of then-Defense Minister Gordon O'Connor, his immediate (competent) response was to promise investigations (from the National Investigation Service and the Canadian Military Board of Inquiry) into these allegations. About the same time, Gen. Rick Hillier proclaimed his confidence that Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan were behaving appropriately and professionally, in addition to providing assurances that all prisoners were handled in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Not long after, the Military Police Complaints Commission launched its own investigation of the handling of Afghan detainees by the Canadian military - however, the three aforementioned abused detainees (along with a fourth one) would disappear ... while in custody of the Afghan National Army (ANA).

To make matters worse, it was reported that when the Harper government was asked to account for the location and condition of 40 detainees captured prior to April 2006 and several dozen taken since then, it refused to disclose what happened to them or even if it knew whether any had been tried, charged, or released, or how they were treated.

In any event, the episode of competence on the part of O'Connor was quite short-lived as he reverted to his default incompetence mode. To whit, the following February 13 and 21 (2007) exchanges in the House of Commons (emphasis added):

LPC MP Denis Coderre: "On the issue of the abuse that some Afghan detainees have suffered, the behaviour of the Minister of National Defense is cause for concern. He is in the know, he has received documents. There is proof that he receives reports every time detainees are transferred. Now, he is refusing to answer, because he is hiding behind the investigations. Given that he knows more than he is letting on, how will he respond to these investigations? Is he willing to testify? Is he willing to release the documents? Is he willing to tell us what he knows, or will he stick his head in the sand as usual?"

CPC Defense Minister Gordon O’Connor: "I can assure this House that at no time was I aware of any abuse of prisoners, period (...)"

BQ MP Caroline St-Hilaire: "The federal government committed to ensuring that Afghan prisoners would not be tortured and that they would be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention until their transfer to Afghan authorities. Amnesty International deplores the lack of compliance with that convention. Can the Minister of National Defense tell us why Canada refuses to follow the example of the Netherlands, which obtained the right to follow up on prisoners transferred to Afghan authorities, in order to ensure that they are treated humanely, that they are not tortured and that their rights are respected?"

Gordon O’Connor: "The current arrangement for detainees was made by the previous government. In that agreement, the International Committee of the Red Cross is mandated to visit and monitor detainees to ensure that they are treated in accordance with the standards of the Geneva Convention. The arrangement also recognizes the role of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission with respect to human rights and detainees. Last fall the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross said that Canada was scrupulous in notifying the Red Cross when it took prisoners and handed them over. We are satisfied with the current arrangements."

Caroline St-Hilaire: "In addition to Amnesty International, Louise Arbour, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that cases of extortion, torture, prolonged imprisonment without trial, and the systematic violation of the rule of law are frequent. The U.S. Department of State has reached the same conclusions. Given these worrisome findings, what is the Minister of National Defense waiting for to put an end to his wilful blindness and immediately emulate the approach taken by the Netherlands with respect to the transfer of prisoners to Afghan authorities?"

Gordon O’Connor: "We are in Afghanistan in support of the Afghan government. When lawbreakers come into our hands, we hand them over to the proper authorities. As I previously explained, they are handed over with all the protections of international laws on prisoners."

The only thing factual O'Connor said in these exchanges concerned the notification of any transfer of detainees to the ICRC. The rest was either pure ignorance-based incompetent balderdash and/or outright dissembling (see above and Part I) - especially regarding his statement that he never saw any reports on detainee abuses, even though the office of then-CPC Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay did in fact receive at least some of them. Of course, MacKay keeps denying it to this day - an obvious lie, considering that: A) detainee abuse reports were widely circulated in Foreign Affairs and Defense department (see above); and B) a December 2006 report from his department, written by the diplomatic corps in Afghanistan, actually asserted that extrajudicial executions, disappearance, torture and detention without trial were common occurrences in Afghan prisons (see again above).

Notice, however, the quiet establishment of a possible excuse: the agreement is a bad one because it was crafted by the previous LPC Martin government and the Harper government simply inherited it.

Typical incompetent reaction. And never mind that Harper and his government had a whole year already to remedy the problematic transfer agreement.

Feeling their feet to the growing fire, the Harper government then signed a deal with the AIHRC to monitor how detainees were treated and bring valid complaints to Canadian authorities - at last adding a layer of scrutiny to the transfer agreement. However, the efficacy of this new mechanism was immediately questioned, considering that: 1) the AIHRC acknowledged that it lacked the necessary staff to monitor all the transferred detainees; and 2) our country had not provided any funding to the AIHRC since 2002. And still, no changes were made to the flawed transfer agreement iteself - especially regarding the absence of Canadian oversight and following-up of transferred detainees.

One step further in time, in the month of March 2007. With the detainee abuse scandal still very much alive, O'Connor went to Kandahar to meet with the leadership of the AIHRC, to ensure that the organization was indeed capable of monitoring the treatment of Taliban detainees handed over by Canadian troops to the Afghan government. We would learn more than two years later that he furthermore visited the prison in Kandahar, all the while escorted by "military officers and by political people", and that he "didn’t see any evidence of torture".

As if a guided visit could somehow allow anyone to stumble upon a detainee actually being tortured. Case in point: for a while, investigators of the AIHRC were initially not allowed to meet with prisoners while they were in the custody of Afghan intelligence officers, although they could meet detainees after they were moved to the regular prison system. Investigators were also denied access to detainees held by the NDS. What was the problem? A communications breakdown. Right. Fortunately, the matter would be resolved (not until April 2007) and thereafter AIHRC investigators would have full, unrestricted access to detainees. Still, this illustrates well the good faith and honesty of the Afghan security forces in the matter of torture, no?

Well, at least they could be quite cavalier in dissembling about it (emphasis added):

Colonel Shir Ali Saddiqui, human-rights ombudsman for the Kandahar police department, told The Globe that he was only aware of two complaints of abuse within the past year of prisoners in police custody.

He said police are taking steps to prevent such actions. He did however say that his colleagues at the NDS sometimes needed to get rough with detainees.

"In these cases, these people need some torture, because without torture they will never say anything," said Saddiqui.

Sadullah Khan, Kandahar NDS chief, initially denied any allegations of torture but eventually acknowledged that minor mistakes have been made.

"We never beat people," he said. "Maybe small things happened, but now we're trying to leave those things behind."

It goes without further comment, wouldn't you agree? And still - no one was aware of detainee abuses in the Harper government, let alone in the Canadian Forces?

Guess again (emphasis added):

None of the captured Afghans -- including those who clearly align themselves with the Taliban -- claimed abuse at the hands of Canadians.

In fact, Canadian Forces were often praised for gentle handling of captives and humane detention facilities.

However, one impoverished farmer, Mahmad Gul, 33, told The Globe that he was interrogated and beaten for three days in May 2006 by the Afghan police -- within earshot of Canadian soldiers who visited him between attacks.

"The Canadians told me, 'Give them real information, or they will do more bad things to you,' " said Gul.

The most gruesome stories come from those held in the cramped basement cells below NDS headquarters in Kandahar.

Most of them reported that they were whipped with electrical cables, some to the point of unconsciousness.

Other said they were stripped and forced to stand outside through cold winter nights in Kandahar, when temperatures drop below freezing.

All that and more - not counting those reports/emails Colvin had been sending to Ottawa (since May 2006 at that - see above). In between, the ICRC finally set O'Connor straight on what it did and did not do - thus forcing him to apologize to the House of Commons for having misinformed the House to this effect. And to think that all he needed have done was a thorough background research, i.e. actually doing his homework as Defense Minister - but alas, that is not how incompetents do things.

For indeed, the hard lesson was not learned and therefore it was incompetence as usual for O'Connor as well as for MacKay (emphasis added):

LPC MP Sue Barnes: "Britain and The Netherlands have agreements in place that allow them to verify that transferred prisoners receive proper treatment, but Canada does not. When will the defense minister take steps to give Canada the same authority as Britain and The Netherlands?"

CPC Defense Minister Gordon O’Connor: "Great Britain and The Netherlands use the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission to monitor the activities of detainees in the Afghan system and we will also."

Sue Barnes: "Four prisoners are missing and Canada has no guaranteed system in place to ensure that prisoners are receiving proper treatment. The government and the defense minister owe Canadians and the House of Commons an explanation about what steps the government has taken to ensure that prisoners are not being mistreated. More particularly, what is the government’s plan if there is evidence that prisoners are being tortured?"

Gordon O’Connor: "The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission has assured us that it will report any abuse of prisoners. It is able to monitor all the prisoners. If it finds abuse, we have asked that it report that abuse to us and we will deal with the Afghan government."

LPC MP Dominic LeBlanc: "Now that the International Committee of the Red Cross has forced the Minister of National Defense to correct the record and confirm that it has no role in the monitoring of the Canada-Afghanistan detainee transfer agreement, can the minister tell Canadians what immediate steps he is taking to verify that detainees captured by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan and transferred to Afghan authorities are being properly treated?"

Gordon O’Connor: "We have engaged the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. It will monitor detainees within the Afghan system and it will report to us any abuses."

(...)

BQ MP Francine Lalonde: "Because the agreement between Canada and Afghanistan is inadequate, the Canadians Forces have no idea how the individuals they have turned over to Afghan authorities so far have been treated. Instead of directing his efforts at trying to justify his lack of action, what is the Minister of Foreign Affairs waiting for to follow the lead of the Netherlands and enter into an agreement with Afghanistan, whereby the government would be kept abreast of how the individuals captured are being treated and could intervene in this regard? It is the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to enter into such agreements. Let him take his responsibilities."

CPC Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay: "I believe that the Minister of National Defense has answered that question. The situation is clear. There is now more protection afforded to those in such situations in Afghanistan. I am convinced that the Minister of National Defense now has the control and information necessary to monitor the situation."

Francine Lalonde: "I know that the Minister of Foreign Affairs does not want to get involved and would rather let his colleague, the Minister of National Defense, deal with the problem but, logically, the Minister of Foreign Affairs should be the one signing agreements with foreign countries. In fact, in the United States, Condoleeza Rice, whom the minister is rather fond of, is the one who signs those kinds of agreements. What is the minister waiting for to sign a comprehensive agreement with the Afghan authorities to meet our international obligations?"

Peter MacKay: "It was actually the Chief of the Defense Staff who signed the original agreement. Since that time, we know the Minister of National Defense has travelled to Afghanistan and met with the necessary officials from the human rights commission there. The Minister of National Defense has this clearly in hand. He knows now what the situation was that had to be addressed. He has taken action on that. The government stands four-square behind its Minister of National Defense who is doing a great job on behalf of Canadians."

And never mind that Canada continued to be derelict in its legally-binding obligations under Article 12 of Geneva III. Furthermore, it came out to light that since the February 2007 deal with the AIHRC, Canadian Forces simply didn't pass along to them any of the names of transferred detainees. Although the Canadian military convolutedly passed said names to the ICRC, let us not forget its long-standing procedure of not reporting back to a foreign power (i.e. Canada, here) on the fate of transferred detainees in custody of a detaining nation (i.e. Afghanistan here - see above and Part I). Furthermore, it appears that soldiers were not clear on what to do if they witnessed abuse or heard complaints of abuse, resorting to verbally advising Afghan interrogators (such as those of the NDS) not to mistreat anyone and explain about human rights and how to treat prisoners.

Consequently, the two layers of protection to transferred detainees, as repeatedly cited by O'Connor over essentially the whole of the past year (and supported by MacKay and the rest of the Harper government), were both flawed.

As the original transfer agreement itself.

Well, that is when Prime Minister Harper finally decided to intervene forcefully in this worsening debacle ... by behaving incompetently (emphasis added):

"I can understand the passion that the leader of the Opposition and members of his party feel for the Taliban prisoners," Harper said. "I just wish occasionally they would show the same passion for Canadian soldiers."

(...) "I would like to see more support in the House of Commons from all sides for Canadian men and women in uniform," he said. "I think Canadians expect that from parliamentarians in every party. They have not been getting it, and they deserve it."

Indeed - rather than genuine leadership, than decisive direction in a proper course of action, the country instead got yet again typical Bushie-like talking points and cheap political attacks.

Thus back we returned to the House of Commons, with essentially the same talking points and blatant ignorance-based incompetence on the part of Harper's government:

LPC MP Denis Coderre: "With his disgraceful reaction to the issue of Taliban prisoners of war yesterday in the House, the Prime Minister once again tarnished Canada’s reputation on the world stage (...) Does the Prime Minister not realize that his disgraceful conduct yesterday sends the wrong signal to the international community that Canada does not respect the Geneva Convention? Does he not know that taking this position could put the lives of our soldiers in great danger by inflaming our enemies and turning the Afghan people against us?"

CPC Leader of the Government in the House of Commons Peter Van Loan: "We would send the wrong signal if we said, like the Liberal Party, that we do not stand behind our troops. We will stand behind our troops. We will ensure that they have in place what they need to protect themselves and ensure that they are protecting Afghan detainees under the Geneva Convention. That is why we are pleased that under this government an agreement was negotiated with the Afghan independent human rights commissioner in order to allow access to detainees and to report back on that to the Canadian government if there is any evidence of any mistreatment."

Denis Coderre: "Not only do we have an irresponsible Prime Minister, but we also have an incompetent, negligent Minister of National Defense who is incapable of handling matters transparently, who is incapable of fulfilling his duties, and who has deceived the people. I have here the Canadian Forces’ code of honour, which talks about duty, loyalty, integrity and courage, and, most importantly, about honour and duty with honour. This is the military ethic, the warrior’s honour. Will the Minister of National Defense practice what he preaches, act according to his military ethic, and prove that he still has a sense of honour by resigning?"

CPC Minister of Defense Gordon O’Connor: "I think I do follow that code and that is why I take responsibility. However, let me remind the member that we will protect detainees within the Afghan prison system. We have recently made an arrangement with the Afghan Human Rights Commission. It has undertaken to supervise the treatment of detainees and that will give us some degree of comfort."

(...)

LPC MP Marlene Jennings: "The minister’s incompetence is astounding. Yesterday, he affirmed that Canadian troops and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission were going to supervise detainees in prisons. Yet, the United Nations Secretary-General said, and I quote: Access remains a problem for the commission. The minister still does not know all the facts and continues to speak nonsense. When will he resign?"

Peter Van Loan: "The government is very proud of the excellent work of our Minister of National Defense and I think most Canadians are very proud as well. We have entered into an agreement that ensures that the independent human rights commission has the opportunity to investigate and report back to us on any reports or any questions on the treatment of detainees. Of course, the original agreement with the Afghan government ensured that the International Committee of the Red Cross also had the same type of access. As a result, we are satisfied that the protection of detainees is ensured under the Geneva Convention."

Incredible, isn't it - and yet quite predictable and expected when one takes into account the Eight Principles of Incompetence.

Be that as it may, as Harper and his cabinet kept being called out for such utter incompetence, the figurative bomb dropped on the collective heads of his government in the following month of April, 2007:

The Globe and Mail newspaper reported (...) that Afghans handed over to local authorities after being interrogated by Canadian soldiers say they have been beaten, whipped, starved, frozen, choked and interrogated by electric shock in Kandahar jails.

Including more than 30 face-to-face interviews with men recently captured in Kandahar province, the newspaper report chronicles claims of abuse by Afghan authorities.

In fact, said interviews uncovered a litany of gruesome stories and a clear pattern of abuse by the Afghan authorities who worked closely with Canadian troops, despite the previous assurances of Harper's government that the rights of detainees were protected.

The reaction of Harper's government to this bombshell? Incompetently predictable.

First were the denials and (of course) cheap counter-accusations - for example (emphasis added):

Prime Minister Stephen Harper described the published reports as "baseless allegations."

Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day accused the opposition parties (...) of repeating "false allegations" of torture made by "suspected terrorists" who are turned over to Afghan officials by Canadian troops.

Mr. Day said yesterday that Canada corrections officials had not seen any evidence of torture. "Something the opposition should be aware of is that the Taliban has been told, trained and instructed to lie if asked about being tortured. As a matter of fact, Taliban are told directly to say they were tortured even if they were not. That makes it difficult," he said.

Both O'Connor and Harper rejected suggestions that the government intentionally buried the fact it was aware of allegations that prisoners were being abused in the hands of Afghan authorities.

Harper insisted his government received no specific reports on possible abuse of captured Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

Harper also went on to suggest that the opposition was taking a direct shot at Canadian troops serving in Afghanistan. "The real problem is the willingness of the leader of the Liberal party and his colleagues to believe to repeat and to exaggerate any charge against the Canadian military as they fight these fanatics and killers that are called the Taliban."

Harper surprised everyone by saying there were no problems in the first place. "We have consulted with the government of Afghanistan over the last several days," Harper said. "We have found no evidence that access is blocked to the prisons. In fact, not only are Afghan authorities agreeing to access to the prisons, they actually agree they will formalize (another) agreement so there is no potential misunderstanding."

The Prime Minister went on the offensive, demanding an apology from the Liberals for what he called "baseless allegations" that Canadians could not get access to prisons in Afghanistan. He then hinted at legal action if any member of the Liberal Party alleged he or any of his ministers had ordered bureaucrats to black out a number of paragraphs that alleged torture and extra-judicial executions of prisoners in a report released to media by the Department of Foreign Affairs under the Access to Information Act.

These were then followed/intertwined by pronouncements and lies that were not only contradictory with previous denials and even between themselves, but some actually further incriminated the Harper government - a few examples (emphasis added):

Defense Minister Gordon O'Connor announced Wednesday that a deal had been struck with Afghan intelligence to get access to prisoners to investigate allegations of torture. Today, Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day stunned the opposition by saying corrections officers have always had access to Afghan detainees after they have been transferred to Afghan officials.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper confirmed on Thursday during question period that officials had yet to draft the aforementioned agreement. But he added that the government expects to "formalize" a deal soon.

The prime minister said the (2006 annual Foreign affairs human rights report - see above) mentioned in the newspaper is an annual report produced for the Foreign Affairs Department that talks about the general state of the Afghan prison system. However, he said the government has no evidence of specific allegations of abuse.

Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay said he didn't have a copy of the report on Monday, when he said he was unaware of any reports of torture. "I have now since reviewed the report," he said. "Having said that, of course we take these matters extremely seriously." He said he is in constant contact with officials in Afghanistan and has asked them to look into the claims of abuse.

"We take such allegations seriously," Prime Minister Stephen Harper said. "That's why we've concluded a deal with the Afghan government. It's why we'll be in discussions with them to pursue this matter."

O'Connor, along with Prime Minister Stephen Harper, countered that Canadian soldiers treat detainees properly and with care. Still, the allegations will be looked into, Harper and O'Connor said."We take these allegations seriously," O'Connor said. "The [Afghanistan Independent] Human Rights Commission promised to advise us if any of our detainees are abused."

"As I've said many times, the government takes these allegations seriously," Harper said. "We have agreements with the government of Afghanistan and also with the Afghan independent human rights commission. The knowledge we have at this point is that those agreements are operating as they should."

Needless to say, the incompetent Harper government was furiously scrambling around and about to save face - throughout calls for the resignation of O'Connor, accusations of cover-ups and outright incompetence.

And thus a new detainee transfer agreement was finally crafted and signed in May 2007, which guaranteed that captured fighters can be interviewed in private without the intimidating presence of their Afghan jailers, at any time and any place. In effect, Canada reclaimed its monitoring jurisdiction over transferred detainees - which had been previously relinquished illegally under the former agreement (see above and Part I). At the same time, the Harper government could feel being "in the clear" regarding Article 21 of the Convention Against Torture (see above), since the discussions and negociations leading to this new agreement could be construed as "communications" under 21.1.1 and 21.1.2 of said article. Same thing regarding Article 12 of Geneva III regarding enacting a primary detaining power's responsibility in rectifying matters if the detaining power to which detainees had been transfered had "problems" respecting Geneva III (again, see above).

In fact, Amnesty International opined that this second agreement may even be better than the other agreements that other NATO countries have individually entered into with the Afghan government.

Thus at last confirming O'Connor's previous, false, boasts to this effect back in April ... 2006 (see Part I).

So - all had become well and good after all - right?

Not so fast - for one, the fact remained that the Harper government still had contravened its legal obligations (Geneva III, Convention Against Torture) throughout the previous year and up to the signing of the second agreement in May 2007. For two, the central issue of whether the government had misled the House of Commons in its statements that torture allegations were merely Taliban propaganda, while at the same time being warned by its own bureaucrats that prisoners are at risk of abuse, remained an open question - indeed, improvements in the way information was communicated internally, implemented under former LPC Chrétien government Defense Minister Bill Graham, made it inconceivable that the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) was not aware of such allegations.

And that they knew all along was evident on the very day of the announcement of the said second transfer agreement (emphasis added):

Ottawa negotiated the deal despite insisting that the allegations of torture were false.

"What we have done is enhance the 2005 agreement -- that is exactly what people were calling for," said Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay.

For unbestknown to anyone, the PMO had begun a veritable campaign of smottering any further allegations of detainee abuse, in addition to begin a campaign of denial of any and all such allegations.

Need I say it - typical incompetent behavior.

And from there, it would only go further downhill ...

(Continued in Part III)