That "War On Terror" Thingie - Part Deux
Seven years into the Global War on Terror(TM) - the world is even more at risk from the "radical terrorism" threat as never before. As predicted time and again, Afghanistan is sinking into a downward spiral, a FUBAR for absolutely nothing - at the cost of billions (even for Canada) and thousands of lives. A disaster and an utter failure. Happy anniversary to the War in Afghanistan, indeed ... bin Laden must be partying like it is still 2001.
Although there seems to be hope for a peaceful resolution of the Afghan war, the matter of Pakistan, Iraq and Palestine remain ... not taking into account the additional threats posed by global warming, the global food and water crises, the global energy crisis, and the global credit crunch. In short: resource wars are looming on the horizon.
Following up on this previous post, here is part two of the series "The War on Terror, Seven years On":
Although there seems to be hope for a peaceful resolution of the Afghan war, the matter of Pakistan, Iraq and Palestine remain ... not taking into account the additional threats posed by global warming, the global food and water crises, the global energy crisis, and the global credit crunch. In short: resource wars are looming on the horizon.
Following up on this previous post, here is part two of the series "The War on Terror, Seven years On":
The war on terror: seven years on (part two)
By Paul Rogers
The previous column in this series reflected on the first seven years of the post-9/11 conflict, and highlighted three of its significant if less prominent aspects - the performance of United States troops, the impact of Washington's relationship with Israel, and the fate of the US-led coalition (see "The war on terror: seven years on - part one", 25 September 2008). This second part of the retrospective - which takes account of the (now) 371 weekly columns in openDemocracy since 26 September 2001 - also looks ahead, to assess the prospects for the emergence of a different security strategy and way of thinking in the coming years.
Such an assessment must begin from an acknowledgment of the current situation. These seven years saw what initially appeared definitive acts of regime-change in Afghanistan (October 2001) and Iraq (March 2003), but which have been followed by two protracted wars. The one in Iraq has diminished in intensity but is still far from over; that in Afghanistan has returned with unexpected ferocity and spread across the border to Pakistan (see "Pakistan: the new frontline", 18 September 2008). The al-Qaida movement that was dispersed and assumed to have been severely weakened by the Afghan overthrow remains active: it is recruiting across the middle east and western Asia, increasing its influence in north Africa and Somalia, and consolidating a leadership that remains secure in supportive communities in western Pakistan (see "Al-Qaida's afterlife", 29 May 2008).
In the United States, a narrative of "victory in Iraq" has been long and actively promoted by conservative voices in politics and media. This is again in the ascendant - if far from uncontested - as violence in the country has either declined (partly as a result of the redrawing of sectarian boundaries) or become confined to particular areas. The narrative, however, is embraced less by the people closest to events; notable here is the caution expressed by US military strategists, and their deep reluctance to contemplate withdrawing more than a small proportion of the 146,000 troops now in Iraq.
In contrast, there is consensus - including bipartisan political support in Washington - that a substantial increase in US military forces in Afghanistan is required. The combination is sobering for military planners: for it means that American troops are most unlikely to withdraw from Iraq in substantial numbers for many years to come, yet that to win in Afghanistan will require at least another decade of war (with the near-certainty of extended military operations in Pakistan factored into US calculations).
In light of these considerations, which are widely shared by thoughtful military analysts on both sides of the Atlantic, the first part of this retrospective asked three questions:
* is there any possibility of a fundamental review of the military policies of the United States and its remaining partners as they continue to pursue the war on terror?
* what does the bitter experience of the last seven years mean for the response of the United states and its partners to wider issues of global security - including the growth in insurgencies and anti-elite unrest, and the potentially devastating consequences of climate change?
* is there any possibility of a changed outlook, and could the results of the forthcoming United States presidential election have any impact?
The limits of revision
The first question raises the issue of a strategic rethink. The answer is that there are are some small indications of a change in outlook in military circles in the United States, and indeed in western Europe. The experience described in Mary Kaldor's openDemocracy article is shared by other independent analysts, who are much more likely to get invited to speak to senior military audiences than as recently as 2005 (see "'New thinking' needs new direction", 25 September 2008). In part this is because of consternation within the higher ranks over the persistent problems of the war on terror, and a search for alternative ways to victory; but there are also occasions when some senior officers appear to question the very basis of the war.
It is also now quite common to have conversations with mid-ranking British soldiers and marines - especially in a conference bar or the officers' mess late in the evening - and find them uncompromising in their contempt for the politicians who landed them with what they see as an impossible task in Iraq. Some will even concede that Afghanistan - no matter how many troops are deployed - is simply not "winnable".
True, such scepticism comes mainly from those close to or on the ground, whereas air-force and naval chiefs are much more concerned to retain their high-tech edge without querying basic strategy. Furthermore, though uncertainty over the course of the war has developed quite rapidly, this rarely entails any revision in the basic aim of defeating opponents (whether they be labelled insurgents, guerrillas or terrorists). A more fundamental questioning of whether pursuing a war on terror was and is the appropriate course of action following the 9/11 events is still rare.
These internal tensions in military thinking are reflected in the main conflict-zones. General David Petraeus, the former commander of United States forces in Iraq who is about to become head of US Central Command (Centcom), led his colleague in a shift of US tactics in Iraq with some effect on the ground; it is just possible that comparable changes of approach in Afghanistan will occur. But the dominant assumption remains, that the United States can use military force to ensure a stable and acceptable pro-American order in the middle east and southwest Asia. There is no real indication yet of awareness that foreign occupations may be untenable - an echo of the way that the military-colonial era continued for some years after the warning-signs of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and Suez in 1956 (see "Afghanistan's Vietnam portent", 17 April 2008).
The occasional reality-check does emerge. A notable coincidence of reports is one: the US commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, seeking a rapid escalation in troop numbers (see "U.S. general urges troop surge in Afghanistan", International Herald Tribune, 2 October 2008) at the very time that the British ambassador in Kabul, Sherard Cowper-Coles, judges - in a leaked report - such reinforcements to be counterproductive and foreign troops to be part of the problem not the solution (see "British envoy says mission in Afghanistan is doomed, according to leaked memo", Times, 2 October 2008). But the dissonance effect of such contradictions, when they come to the light, is treated as a problem to be managed rather than an opening to a real debate.
The state-centric vision
The second question addresses the problem of future security threats. A few military think-tanks and associated circles are slowly coming round to the view that a focus on the current war on terror carries the danger of missing the key emerging drivers of insecurity. There is belated recognition, for example, that the combination of a widening global socio-economic divide and widespread awareness of marginalisation and injustice is more likely to create an age of insurgencies than a clash of civilisations. The Maoists in Nepal, the Naxalites in India and the extensive social unrest in China can be seen as indicators of deeper, systemic problems (see "China and India: heartlands of global protest", 7 August 2008). In addition, it is becoming clearer that wealthy urban-industrial societies are particularly vulnerable to civil unrest, especially from radical and violent social movements (see "The global economic war", 14 August 2008).
There is a growing perception too among some military analysts that climate change and resource-scarcity could each have formidable security consequences (see "A global threat multiplier", 20 March 2008).
These shifts of outlook are welcome, but a large problem persists. This is that the perspective of these institutions and figures remains locked in the requirement of securing the state, either on its own or in alliances. The publication in March 2008 of the United Kingdom's national-security strategy, for example, refers to many of the above concerns while considering them strictly from the need to maintain the country's well-being and its ability to react successfully (see Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy, 19 March 2008).
The use of old tools to handle new problems means that concern about socio-economic division, marginalisation, resource-scarcity or climate change is not matched by an ability to see their true dimensions or interconnections. The result is that the causes of future insecurity are viewed through a state-centric lens rather than a global and sustainable-security one (see "A tale of two futures", 1 May 2008).
The next seven years
The third question speaks to the overall chance of a reorientation of official policy, most immediately in relation to the outcome of the United States presidential election on 4 November 2008. The signs are mixed, but there is some cause for optimism, if only because the many problems that have arisen from the conduct of the war on terror are calling into question the "control paradigm" that lies at the heart of western security strategy (see "A world beyond control", 22 May 2008). The questioning may not yet be radical enough - but it is starting.
(Keep reading ...)
By Paul Rogers
The previous column in this series reflected on the first seven years of the post-9/11 conflict, and highlighted three of its significant if less prominent aspects - the performance of United States troops, the impact of Washington's relationship with Israel, and the fate of the US-led coalition (see "The war on terror: seven years on - part one", 25 September 2008). This second part of the retrospective - which takes account of the (now) 371 weekly columns in openDemocracy since 26 September 2001 - also looks ahead, to assess the prospects for the emergence of a different security strategy and way of thinking in the coming years.
Such an assessment must begin from an acknowledgment of the current situation. These seven years saw what initially appeared definitive acts of regime-change in Afghanistan (October 2001) and Iraq (March 2003), but which have been followed by two protracted wars. The one in Iraq has diminished in intensity but is still far from over; that in Afghanistan has returned with unexpected ferocity and spread across the border to Pakistan (see "Pakistan: the new frontline", 18 September 2008). The al-Qaida movement that was dispersed and assumed to have been severely weakened by the Afghan overthrow remains active: it is recruiting across the middle east and western Asia, increasing its influence in north Africa and Somalia, and consolidating a leadership that remains secure in supportive communities in western Pakistan (see "Al-Qaida's afterlife", 29 May 2008).
In the United States, a narrative of "victory in Iraq" has been long and actively promoted by conservative voices in politics and media. This is again in the ascendant - if far from uncontested - as violence in the country has either declined (partly as a result of the redrawing of sectarian boundaries) or become confined to particular areas. The narrative, however, is embraced less by the people closest to events; notable here is the caution expressed by US military strategists, and their deep reluctance to contemplate withdrawing more than a small proportion of the 146,000 troops now in Iraq.
In contrast, there is consensus - including bipartisan political support in Washington - that a substantial increase in US military forces in Afghanistan is required. The combination is sobering for military planners: for it means that American troops are most unlikely to withdraw from Iraq in substantial numbers for many years to come, yet that to win in Afghanistan will require at least another decade of war (with the near-certainty of extended military operations in Pakistan factored into US calculations).
In light of these considerations, which are widely shared by thoughtful military analysts on both sides of the Atlantic, the first part of this retrospective asked three questions:
* is there any possibility of a fundamental review of the military policies of the United States and its remaining partners as they continue to pursue the war on terror?
* what does the bitter experience of the last seven years mean for the response of the United states and its partners to wider issues of global security - including the growth in insurgencies and anti-elite unrest, and the potentially devastating consequences of climate change?
* is there any possibility of a changed outlook, and could the results of the forthcoming United States presidential election have any impact?
The limits of revision
The first question raises the issue of a strategic rethink. The answer is that there are are some small indications of a change in outlook in military circles in the United States, and indeed in western Europe. The experience described in Mary Kaldor's openDemocracy article is shared by other independent analysts, who are much more likely to get invited to speak to senior military audiences than as recently as 2005 (see "'New thinking' needs new direction", 25 September 2008). In part this is because of consternation within the higher ranks over the persistent problems of the war on terror, and a search for alternative ways to victory; but there are also occasions when some senior officers appear to question the very basis of the war.
It is also now quite common to have conversations with mid-ranking British soldiers and marines - especially in a conference bar or the officers' mess late in the evening - and find them uncompromising in their contempt for the politicians who landed them with what they see as an impossible task in Iraq. Some will even concede that Afghanistan - no matter how many troops are deployed - is simply not "winnable".
True, such scepticism comes mainly from those close to or on the ground, whereas air-force and naval chiefs are much more concerned to retain their high-tech edge without querying basic strategy. Furthermore, though uncertainty over the course of the war has developed quite rapidly, this rarely entails any revision in the basic aim of defeating opponents (whether they be labelled insurgents, guerrillas or terrorists). A more fundamental questioning of whether pursuing a war on terror was and is the appropriate course of action following the 9/11 events is still rare.
These internal tensions in military thinking are reflected in the main conflict-zones. General David Petraeus, the former commander of United States forces in Iraq who is about to become head of US Central Command (Centcom), led his colleague in a shift of US tactics in Iraq with some effect on the ground; it is just possible that comparable changes of approach in Afghanistan will occur. But the dominant assumption remains, that the United States can use military force to ensure a stable and acceptable pro-American order in the middle east and southwest Asia. There is no real indication yet of awareness that foreign occupations may be untenable - an echo of the way that the military-colonial era continued for some years after the warning-signs of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and Suez in 1956 (see "Afghanistan's Vietnam portent", 17 April 2008).
The occasional reality-check does emerge. A notable coincidence of reports is one: the US commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, seeking a rapid escalation in troop numbers (see "U.S. general urges troop surge in Afghanistan", International Herald Tribune, 2 October 2008) at the very time that the British ambassador in Kabul, Sherard Cowper-Coles, judges - in a leaked report - such reinforcements to be counterproductive and foreign troops to be part of the problem not the solution (see "British envoy says mission in Afghanistan is doomed, according to leaked memo", Times, 2 October 2008). But the dissonance effect of such contradictions, when they come to the light, is treated as a problem to be managed rather than an opening to a real debate.
The state-centric vision
The second question addresses the problem of future security threats. A few military think-tanks and associated circles are slowly coming round to the view that a focus on the current war on terror carries the danger of missing the key emerging drivers of insecurity. There is belated recognition, for example, that the combination of a widening global socio-economic divide and widespread awareness of marginalisation and injustice is more likely to create an age of insurgencies than a clash of civilisations. The Maoists in Nepal, the Naxalites in India and the extensive social unrest in China can be seen as indicators of deeper, systemic problems (see "China and India: heartlands of global protest", 7 August 2008). In addition, it is becoming clearer that wealthy urban-industrial societies are particularly vulnerable to civil unrest, especially from radical and violent social movements (see "The global economic war", 14 August 2008).
There is a growing perception too among some military analysts that climate change and resource-scarcity could each have formidable security consequences (see "A global threat multiplier", 20 March 2008).
These shifts of outlook are welcome, but a large problem persists. This is that the perspective of these institutions and figures remains locked in the requirement of securing the state, either on its own or in alliances. The publication in March 2008 of the United Kingdom's national-security strategy, for example, refers to many of the above concerns while considering them strictly from the need to maintain the country's well-being and its ability to react successfully (see Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy, 19 March 2008).
The use of old tools to handle new problems means that concern about socio-economic division, marginalisation, resource-scarcity or climate change is not matched by an ability to see their true dimensions or interconnections. The result is that the causes of future insecurity are viewed through a state-centric lens rather than a global and sustainable-security one (see "A tale of two futures", 1 May 2008).
The next seven years
The third question speaks to the overall chance of a reorientation of official policy, most immediately in relation to the outcome of the United States presidential election on 4 November 2008. The signs are mixed, but there is some cause for optimism, if only because the many problems that have arisen from the conduct of the war on terror are calling into question the "control paradigm" that lies at the heart of western security strategy (see "A world beyond control", 22 May 2008). The questioning may not yet be radical enough - but it is starting.
(Keep reading ...)
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