Reaping What Was Sown - Again And Again

(Updated below)

Pakistan has often been praised by the Bush administration, among others, for its role in the Global War on Terror(TM). President Bush even once proclaimed a broad and lasting strategic partnership with Pakistan to this effect.

Despite evidence to the contrary.

In a previous article of mine dealing with the conveniently forgotten quagmire that has become the Afghan War, I outlined examples whereby Pakistan has proven so far to be quite ineffective as an ally against the ongoing Taliban insurgency and al-Qaeda overall - at the very least.

Allow me to restate my case herein by way of introducing the crux of the matter for this current article.

A) Although initially helping to round up remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban (after their defeat in the summer of 2002) on its own side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the Pakistani army quickly found itself in a sub-war (dubbed the Waziristan War) which began in the spring of 2004 and ended in the summer of 2006, being pitted against al-Qaeda and other militants joined by local rebels and pro-Taliban tribal forces - all believed to be connected with the Taliban insurgency. A peace agreement was signed in September 2006 between the Pakistani government and the pro-Taliban militants, encouraged by the Tribal Elders in power in the region.

B) The provisions of this peace agreement included, among others, a significant reduction of Pakistani troops in the Waziristan region and the release of some 2500 al-Qaeda and pro-Taliban militants previously captured. Consequently, al-Qaeda and the Taliban have free reign at hiding within Pakistan.

C) Since then, Pakistan's "help" against al-Qaeda and the Taliban has been going downhill. Osama bin Laden was ascertained all along of being in hiding in Pakistan, whereby the Pakistani "lost his trail" quite a while ago. Furthermore, al-Qaeda funding still goes through Pakistan.

and D) Despite previous claims (see above), members of the Bush administration have begun this year to call upon Pakistan to "step up" further with its help in fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban, even going as far as to threaten military strikes within Pakistan's side of the border with Afghanistan, without Pakistan's permission.

In between, there has been a resurgence of terrorist attacks in Pakistan, as well as clashes and confrontations between Pakistani forces and pro-Taliban/al-Qaeda forces - in fact, Pakistan is deemed likely to face a civil war should it presses on further in the areas where al-Qaeda and the Taliban are hiding. Furthermore, President (dictator) Musharraf may yet declare martial law, even if he has so far publicly rejected the option. Meanwhile, the only solution that President Bush could come up with in solving this dire problem is by seeking a $2 billion Pakistan aid package from Congress, in order to help financing tribal paramilitary groups in the semi-autonomous region of Waziristan in Pakistan (where al-Qaeda and the Taliban have gained such a foothold) as part of an American-Pakistani joint counterinsurgency effort designed to wrest the region from extremist militants.

Now here's the problem with this "grand idea": newly declassified documents show that Pakistan was ever a staunch supporter of the Taliban, contributing significantly to its arming and gaining power in Afghanistan, back in 1996. And between then and 9/11, Pakistan continued with its significant military and financial aid to the Taliban.

Why? Because throughout the 90's, the ISI (Pakistani intelligence) considered Islamic extremists to be foreign policy assets. In other words, the Taliban were a necessary evil to keep close as a friend - the same way the U.S.A. not only turned a convenient blind eye when the Taliban seized power, but likewise provided military and financial support during the late 70's and throughout the 80's. Perhaps this is why the U.S.A. watched Pakistan support the Taliban without so much as a peep in protest.

Hence, Pakistan's current problems with radical islamists and pro-Taliban militants are of its own making - in turn, this explains why it can't be an effective ally against the Taliban insurgency, let alone being a discrete participant.

Even (democratic party presidential candidate) Barack Obama's own recent call for striking at al-Qaeda and pro-Taliban forces within Pakistan will definitely not spur Pakistan on - au contraire.

Because, in short, Pakistan painted itself in a corner long before 9/11 and the launch of the Afghan War.

What I find ironic here is that Pakistan's situation is, in essence, no different from that of the U.S.A. - two cases in point, among many:

Osama bin Laden was for a time financed by the U.S.A. in Afghanistan, against the former U.S.S.R. occupying armies;

Saddam Hussein was for a time well supported by military and financial aid from the U.S.A., especially in his war against Iran.

Apparently, no one is considering the high likelihood that significant portions of the proposed $2 billion in Pakistan aid to arm tribal paramilitary groups will end up in the hands of actual allies of al-Qaeda and/or the Taliban - it would seem that "serious" people keep forgetting that there may be a reason why pro-Taliban forces find themselves quite at home with the tribes of Waziristan.

And once some (if not most) of these tribal paramilitaries show their true allegiance, how "easy" do you think it will be to disarm them? No doubt probably as "easy" as in the case of those militias under orders of the Afghan Warlords, with whom the U.S.A. made a deal to enlist their help against the Taliban during the Afghan War.

I say it here: Pakistan and the U.S.A. will be once again reaping what they have sown through their incompetence-driven short-sightedness ...

... as they have before and as they are still now.

Some FUBAR with that Global War of Terror(TM), anyone?


Update: 08/18/2007 - I just found this article (from August 6, 2007) today which analyzes the Pakistan aid bill, the potential impact on U.S./N.A.T.O. strikes within Pakistan and how it is that pro-Taliban forces feel so at home among the Tribal regions of Pakistan. In essence, the conclusion of this article is the same as mine: Pakistan has put itself between a rock and a hard place with regards to radical islamism. Go read the article - it is worth it, in my humble opinion.


(Cross-posted at DKos, at Progressive Historians, at Suzie-Q and at Diatribune)